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Abstract
Philosophical theories of collective action have produced a number of alternative accounts of the
rationality and morality of self-interest and altruism. These have obvious applications to
communicable disease control, the avoidance of antibiotic resistance, the responsibility of
healthcare professionals to patients with serious communicable diseases, and the sharing of
personal data in epidemiological research.
There is no problem more central ethics than the question
''Why should I be moral?'' An influential way of posing
this question is to put this in terms of self-interest. Why
should I act in a way which is, or seems to me to be, con-
trary to my own personal interests, even where this may
produce benefits, or avoid harm, to another person or
group? There are a number of different theories of ethics
which attempt to answer this question.
One popular approach is to draw on evolutionary theory
and the theory of games. In this approach, it is argued that
although self-interested behaviour may pay off in the
short term, in the long term each individual benefits by
cooperating (including occasional sacrifices of one's own
interests for the benefit of others). This approach has been
elaborated in evolutionary theory and moral philosophy
by many writers[1-3]. The appeal of this theory is quite
broad. Firstly, it seems to be empirically grounded. It is
not a pious appeal to a principle such as "Do as you would
be done by", but a demonstrably successful evolutionarily
stable strategy. Second, it seems to prove that there is no
radical distinction between morality and self-interest.
Morality is just a generalised version of self-interest. The
genuinely self-interested person would be moral, because
this is the strategy with the best long-term expected pay-
off for him or her. Trade-offs of his or her self-interest are
at worst short-term losses that can be considered invest-
ments for long-term gain.
This argument is, moreover, appealing in practice. It gives
a plausible account of why parents ought to vaccinate
their children against communicable diseases, why peo-
ple with sexually transmitted diseases should be encour-
aged to tell their partners (even where telling might risk
the continuity of a desired relationship), and why people
ought not to take antibacterials for viral diseases and
ought to comply with medical instructions when taking
antibiotics.
However, a lot of this appeal is only apparent. The game
theoretic argument usually founders, for three reasons.
Firstly, in many cases in modern societies it is hard to per-
suade people to sacrifice their interest to unknown stran-
gers, and there is often a strong common interest in not
doing so (for instance in cooperating with one's own
declared enemies over some public health problem). Sec-
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ondly, in many cases there is a short, quite definite series
of interactions, so that the pay-off for cheating may in fact
be strong. For instance, each parent needs to choose to
vaccinate each child only once, so non-vaccination looks
like a rational strategy if enough other parents vaccinate.
This strategy is an instance of the well known "free-rider"
problem in economic theory. Thirdly, the model depends
on there being agreement about what the costs, risks and
pay-offs really are. In the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR)
vaccine case, some parents may disagree with the health-
care professionals not only about the degree of risk posed
by the vaccine but also about the seriousness of autism
vis-à-vis measles (say), and hence calculate their pay-off
differently. Under these circumstances, what looks like a
rational trade-off to the professional looks irrational to
the parent purely because the calculations of benefit and
harm differ.
The problems identified here underlie many interesting
issues in public health policy, but in ethical theory the
most interesting point is that if morality rests on an
extended theory of self-interest alone, then any specific
proposal about collective action can founder on the three
problems I have discussed here. If we want people to act
morally, it is not because so acting is in enlightened self-
interest alone, but because sometimes we need people to
make genuine sacrifices of their interests to the benefit of
others: to act against their interests, in the certainty or
high probability of personal loss. Although evolutionary
theory does suggest that sacrifice by individuals in a spe-
cies can be explained by benefit to other individuals with
common genetic material, I suggest that this approach
does not entirely circumvent the issue, and we need to
consider a properly moral theory rather than a rational
interest theory [4].
What should such a theory look like? Most recent work in
the ethics of public health applies a utilitarian, a commu-
nitarian, or a liberal approach. For a utilitarian, we ought
to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of
people. Doing so may involve coercive measures which
compel individuals to act against their own perceived best
interests in the name of the public good. Coercive policies
have the obvious disadvantages, first, that they may create
improper infringements of individual rights, and, second,
that they may grant too great an authority to specific indi-
viduals or agencies to determine of what the public good
consists[5]. For a communitarian, there is a similar
emphasis on the public good, combined with the idea
that our personal interests and identities are formed out of
our membership of a community with specific values,
rather than the nature of the community being fixed by
our collected individual interests. Again, appeal to com-
mon interests solves the problem of individual-collective
conflicts, but arguably at too high a cost in terms of
infringements of individual liberties[6].
The most likely solutions lie within liberalism. Following
the ideas of John Stuart Mill, liberals believe that individ-
uals should be free to live as they think best, subject only
to the limitation that their actions and choices should not
cause harm to others. This captures the idea that we
should respect individual rights but also identify strict
limits to those rights. A difficulty is that it is sometimes
controversial what counts as a harm, and how significant
it has to be for public policy to act to prevent it: a good
example is the contemporary debate on second-hand
smoke in public places[7]. Second, it can be easier to
defend some restrictions on individual actions (stop
smoking!), but harder to defend compelling people to do
specific things (vaccinate your children!). The answer to
this problem is that coercive legislation and other state
interventions need good theoretical justifications and
public, democratic oversight to ensure that they are both
legitimate and proportionate to the threat being control-
led. Good public health needs strong democracy[8,9].
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